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In the Sttprente Court of the 
State of Utah 
SH!ERMAN JONES, MERLE JONES, I 
BRYANT JONES and LARAINE JONES, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
vs. 
:\LVIE L. THORVALIDSON, E. NOREEN 
THORVALDSON, MERRI:LL OLDROYD 
and 0. THAYNE ACORD, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
APPELLANTS' BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
CASE 
NO. 10043 
The Jones instituted this action by filing a comp]ajnt 
asking for a declaratory judgment to determine to whom 
they should pay royalty for gravel obtained by them from 
property owned by MeiTill OldToyd and by him leased to 
the Thorvaldsons. The Thorvaldsons filed a counterclaim 
against the Jones and at the end of the trial on the coun-
terclaim the Court found that the Jones had forfeited 
their rights in the leased property for an implied covenant. 
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'Dhe only parties in this case on appeal are the Jones 
and the Thorvaldsons. The action between the ThorvaJ.d-
sons and the Oldroyds and Acord was disposed of prior to 
the trial of the case between the Jones and the Thorvald-
sons. In that action 1Jhe Court held that the Thorvaldsons 
held no interest in 1:!he Oldroyd property, this being a gra-
vel pit mentioned in the lease hereinafter set forth. The 
Thorvaldsons have not appealed from that decision. Here-
after, reference to the parties will be as Jones and Thor-
valdsons. 
The question in this case is whether the Jones' al-
leged violations of the terms of a written lease, the appli-
caJble parts of which are set forth below, are such as to au-
thorize :fue trial Court to find that the Jones had for-
feited their rights in the property described in said lease. 
We set forth the pertinent parts of the lease entered 
into between Thorvaldsons and Jones: TR. 8. 
''This agreement, made and entered into this 11th day 
of December, A. D. 1957, by and between Alvie L. 
Thorvaldson and E. Noreen Thorvaldson, his wife, of 
Payson, Utah County, State of Utah, hereinafter called 
the Parties of the First Part, Lessors, and Sherman 
Jones and Merle Jones, his wife, and Bryant Jones 
and Laraine Jones, his wife, of Delrta, Millard County, 
State of Utah, hereinafter called the Parties of the Sec-
ond Part, · Lesees. 
WITNESSETII: 
"That the Lessors, Parties of the first part, for and in 
consideration of the rents, covenants and agreements 
hereuiafter contained on ·the part of the Lessees to be 
paid, kept and performed, have granted, demised, 
leased, aSSigned, and by these presents do grant, de-
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3 
mise, lease, assign and let rmto the Lessees, for the 
purpose of operating, mining, producing and market-
ing such quantities of sand, gravel, top soil and fill dirt 
as may be fotmd in and on the certain tracts of land 
which the parties of the first part represent they are 
the owners in fee simple title, which property is more 
particularly described as follows: 
(Description of land omitted) 
uAnd that certain parcel of land which the parties 
of the first part have, by contract and agreement, ac-
quired from Merrill L. Oldroyd and Lola Oldroyd, his 
wife. of Payson, Utah, which property is described as 
follows: 
(Description of land omitted) 
"It is agreed that the lease to the fiTst mentioned 
property and the assignment of agreement and lease 
to the second described property shall continue in force 
and effect for a period of twenty years, from the first 
day of January, 1958, to the first day of Janaury, 1978, 
with the exclusive right granted to 'the Lessees herein 
to renew the said lease for an additional twenty years 
in accordance with the provisions and stipulations in 
this agreement contained. It is agreed that the Les-
sees shall take possession, operate and sell gravel, sand, 
soil and dirt from the said premises on and after Jan-
uary 1, 1958. 
"In consideration of the premises, the Lessees and 
Assignees herein covenant and agree to deliver or pay 
to the Lessors 25 cents for each cubic yard of sand, 
gravel or top soil mined, processed, or produced from 
the said premises and by the Lessees disposed of on 
the market, and they also agree to pay to the Lessors 
one cent for each cubic yard of fill dirt removed from 
the said premises . . . . Lease payments shall be 
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made to the Lessors at Payson, Utah, unless other ad-
dress is pro~ lded to the Lessees. Payments shall be 
made between the first and tenth days of each three 
month calendar period. 
"It is agreed that the books of the Lessees shall be 
aoce:;sible to the Lessors for the purpose of computing 
the output of such marketed sand, grave1 and dirt at 
all times. Duplicate sales slips shall be preserved in 
numerical order and at regular three-month intervals 
shall be subject to inspection by the Lessors. The Les-
sors shall also have aocess to the pits and premises at 
all times for the purpose of comparison by way of quan-
tity of sand and gravel removed therefrom. 
''. . . . The Lessees agree to keep all overburden 
removed which would in any way inhtbit or retard the 
success of the business. 
''If the Lessors own a less interest in the above de-
scribed lands than herein represented, then the royal-
ties and rentals herein provided for shall be paid the 
Lessors only in proportion which their interest beaTS 
to the whole and undivided fee. 
"It is further stipulated and agreed between the 
parties hereto that the Lessees shall conduct the said 
business in such a manner as to adequately and timely 
fill all orders and supply all requests of customers. If 
the Lessees fail to operate the business in a proper, 
businesslike ·and workmanli~ manner and/or fail be-
cause of business practices to keep up with the de-
mand, the same will constitute grounds for forfeiture 
of this lease." 
The Court found that the Jones' failure to perform 
any one of the following things constituted grounds to de-
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Clan» that Jones had forfeited their right in the leased 
pro~rty: 
( 1) Failure to remove the overburden ; 
( 2) F'ailure to make sales slips for materials reason-
ably soon after the sale of the said materials and delivery 
of tht> material to the customer; 
(3) That the Jones removed sand and gravel off 
tht> premises without accounting for any of it; 
( 4) They abandoned the business of selling sand and 
gravel on the leased premises and removed their activities 
off the leased premises; 
(5) Failw-e to account for all sales of sand and gra-
vel. 
The evidence :respecting those issues is as follows: 
FAILURE TO REMOVE OVERBURDEN 
Mr. Isaah Rex Allen, called as a witness by the Thor-
valdsons. He testified that further operation of the pit 
was prevented because the overburden was not removed. 
TR. 140. He further testified that in removing the over-
burden, it could easily affect 1,000 yards.~ This witness 
said it would take at least ten eightJhour days to remove 
the overburden. TR. 142-143. Mr. Allen stated that so 
far as he knows the Jones could be taking sand from the 
pit at the time of the trial. He said the sand would be too 
dirty for cement purposes. TR. 145. 
Grant E. Lloyd, a son-in-law of the Thorvaldsons, and. 
Thorvaldsons' witness for them, testified: "There would 
be at least three days work to get this big pit in good shape 
again." TR .. 246. 
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Thorvaldson testified that in his judginent there would 
be aJbout 1,000 yards of sand contaminated. TR. 185. 
Jones testified that he has never had any concrete re-
jected because of dirt in it. TR. 272-273. Jones stated that 
he was not having any trouble with the overburden and 
can remove the overburden without hazard to a driver .. 
TR. 24. J one~ testified that this overburden was there 
when they leased the property from Thorvaldsons. TR. 
181. 
F AlLURE TO :MAKE SALES SLIPS 
Leon Woodfield, a Certified Public Accountant called 
as a witness by Thorvaldsons, testified as follows: "In con-
nection with tlhe audit and comparing the recorded infor-
mation that I found in reports given to me by Mr. Jones, 
I found some differences. For example, during the period 
of October, ending Oct., 1961, there was a difference of 
37.80 tons or cubic yeards, exouse me." TR. 131. That 
was out of a total reported by Jones to him of 82.9.70 yards. 
"In April of 1963, there was a difference of 8.5 out of 536. 
There was also. a difference in the sand and gravel of 5.0 
out of a total of 145. And then in May of 1962, with re-
~t to the sand, out of 170, there was a difference of .25 
and for the gravel, 136, there was 2- ~." TR. 132. 
The witness also testified that in his experience in au-
diting items of this kind tlhat it was not unusual to locate 
or find di-fferences of this small amount. TR. 132. He 
further testified that there are normally small differences 
in the audit. TR. 132. In the last quarter there were lar-
ger differenCes between the report going to Mr. Thorvald-
son and the repOrted sales that are not included on the re-
port. TR. 132. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
'{ 
Jones testified: "We keep om invoices in nwnerical 
order and do not make them at the end of the qu~'. 
Tit 170. He further stated: "As I explained before, if a 
person in the case of a contract orders so many linear feet 
of ditch. we go ahead and we keep track of the amount of 
material we put in that ditch until that project is done 
and then we will see if that is all he needs and get it ap-
proved and make sme that is all he will need, and then I 
will make up the invoice." TR. 171. 
"Question: Sometimes you are so busy that you can't 
make them up for two or three days, is that not true? 
"Answer: The only case that they may not be made 
up for two or three days is if I have not received a report 
from one of the other fellows or that I am out of town and 
I am not there to take care of it." TR. 171. 
Mr. Thorvaldson was asked: "It is true, isn't it Mr. 
Thorvaldson, that in that whole year's time, the auditor 
found a difference between the records of the Jones and 
that which they had reported to you of only 43.8 yards?" 
TR. 227. 
"Answer: I don't remember exactly. He wasn't able 
to determine entirely, according to what he said. He said 
he couldn't get an accurate account." TR. 227. 
The witness, Thorvaldson, in testifying about what the 
audit disclosed, testified that the second audit found a 
shortage, but the first one wasn't too bad, and that after 
the first audit had been made, Jones sent him a check for 
S112.42. This covered a six months period. TR. 189-191. 
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REMOVAL OF SAND AND GRAVEL WITHOUT 
ACCOUNTING FOR IT. 
Jones, in testifying about the amount of sand stock-
piled, stated: ''There is no large amount stockpiled. There 
may be 100 yards now." TR. 163. 
POINT I 
THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE 
JONES ABANDONED THE LEASED PROPERTY AND 
FORFEITED THEIR RIGHT THEREIN BY FAILURE 
TO MAINTAIN A MIX BATCH PLANT ON THiE 
LEASED PREMISES AND THAT UNLESS THE MIX 
BATCH PLANT WAS MAINTAINED ON THE PREM-
ISBS AND AfLL PROCESSING DONE THEREON THE 
CONTRACT CONTAINED NO OONSIDERATION. 
The lease above referred to was reformed to include 
land not described in the lease. TR. 68. The Court, in 
drawing the boundary line between the property leased to 
Jones and that retained by Thorvaldson, awarded Thor-
valdson property upon which a well was located from which 
water was used to operate a mix batch plant (TR. 237) 
and also a portable mix batch plant. TR. 236. Later, Jones 
purchased five acres of land adjoining the Thorvaldson 
property upon which he built a mix baitch plant and sunk 
a well at a cost of $2.,000.00. TR. 280. Thereafter, all pro-
cessing was done on the Jones property. TR. 110. Jones 
went into possession of the leased property in January, 
1958, and from that time until he was evicted from said 
premises by order of the Court, continued to dig and mine 
sand :fu:um the property owned by Thorvaldson and gravel 
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from the property Thorvaldson had leased from Oldroyd, 
and sold and delivered the same to customers. It is evi-
dent fron1 the Court's comments during the trial that the 
Jones' failure to do all of their processing on the Thor-
valdson property was the real reason why the Court de-
clared a forfeiture. The Court asked the attorney for 
Thorvaldson to define the issues. Counsel replied, ''They 
have moved off the property completely". TR. 109. The 
Court asked, 11Have they moved the business from the 
pt-em.ises?" Counsel for Jones answered, 11So far as the 
batch plant is concerned they have." TR. 110. Counsel 
for Thorvaldson, reading from the deposition of Jones: "You 
didn't pay any royalty on that material you process and 
manufacture on your own property?" Answer: "Only that 
we removed from the leased property''. Question to Jones 
by attorney for Thorvaldsoo: "Do you have any requ.iTe-
ment to take any material from Mr. Thorvaldson.'s prop-
erty?" Answer: "No, there is no determined amount." 
Then the Court said, "I am afraid you have got a forfeiture 
here, Mr. Hodgson". TR. 111. 
The Court further said: "I am saying tJhis in view 
of what we said in the other case and considering the testi-
mony we had there and the arguments and all. And it was 
one of the requirements, an indispensable requirement of 
the validity of the lease that they maintain that business on 
those leased premises; to nrlne the sand and gravel and 
process it there so that there would be consideration, and it 
had to be done in a manner that would take care of ·the busi-
ness and the customers for that kind of business. Now, if 
they have moved off the property and proces9ed elsewhere 
and get materials from other sources as well, then there is 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
10 
a forfeiture af 111-Iis lease, a failure of consideration." TR. 
111-112. 
The Court said that the Jones were required to main-
tain the business on the premises and as authority for that 
proposition statc--"d: "Well, there is the requirement that 
they maintain the business on the premises. (Quoting firom 
the lease agreement) 'It is further stipulated and agreed 
between the parties hereto that the Lessees shall conduct 
the said business in such a manner as to adequately and 
thnely fill all orders and supply all requests of customers.' " 
TR. 114. 
Mr. Hodgson: "Now it doesn't say, Your Honor, that 
they conduct it upon the leased premises." 
The Court: "No, those words are not in there, but 
they are implicit to give validity to the lease." TR. 115. 
The Court: ''As I remember the testimony in the other 
case there was a business on the premises being conducted, 
and this business was sold lock-stock and barrel to the Jones 
boys. They bought all the equipment and then he took a 
lease on the premises and agreed to pay so much royalty 
for materials that went through that business-sold from 
that business. And that was wheTe Mr. Thorvaldson was 
gOing to derive his revenue. There would be no consider-
ation if they coold just take that lease and hold it for 20 
or 40 years and process and operate across the street or at 
some other location. The lease would lack consideration." 
TR. 115. 
Mr. Hodgson: "But I think we have to go look at the 
whole of the lease and the whole of the situation, your 
Honor." TR. 115. 
The Court: "I think that's right. I think you are 
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right. We han' to look at the whole thing." TR. 115. 
1\Ir. Hodgson: "Part of this business was not just 
the processing of sand which was taken from the Thor-
v:~ldson sand pit, and gravel which was taken from the 
Oldroyd gravel pit and made into ready mixed concrete. 
Btu part of the business was, and is, and will be in :fue 
future, the taking of sand and top sodl and fill dirt or over-
hurdcn from the sand bed properties and selling them to 
l'llstomers who come there for no other purpose than to 
purchase them irrespective of whether there is a batch 
plant there or a batch plant a hundred yards down the road; 
and part of the conducting of that business, the business 
which is the overall business of sand, gravel, and concrete, 
is still being conducted and must still be oonducted under 
the terms of this lease, irrespective of where these men 
have their batch plant. It can still be conducted out at 
that pit, irrespective of whethe·r they have a batch plant 
on it or not." TR. 115-116. 
The Court: "Part of it, but the processing is not done 
there anymore, is it?" TR. 116. 
Mr. Hodgson: "No." TR. 116. 
The Court: "Then you would probably a-dmit there 
is a partial failure of consideration? Mr. Thorvaldson gets 
no revenue from any of the processing?" TR. 116. 
Mr. Hoclgson: "That isn't true, beoause the sand 
whkh they still use must come from the sand bed irrespec-
tive of where it's hatched out. And until March 1st, the 
gravel which was used came from the Oldroyd pit which 
was under the lease, and which, through no cause of these 
plaintiffs, is now terminated." TR. 116. 
The Court: "Well in my mind now that you :have ad-
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mitted that the batch plant has been removed and the pro-
cessing no longer takes place there, to my mind, that con-
stitutes a sufficient breach to work a forfeiture of the lease. 
Now, the Supreme Court might not say so, if you appeal 
to the Supreme Court. Therefore, you better produce all 
your evidence." TR. 118. 
We again quote from the Court: "Yes it was. That 
he had to pay Mr. Thorvaldson forr all materials processed 
on the premises; and it was within the oontemplation of 
the· parties that he would process on the premises or that 
word wouldn't have been in there." TR. 113. 
Mr. Hodgson stated: "That is true, burt nothing was 
said in that case nor in the decision in that case as to 1Jhe 
requirement that they continue to bring all materials that 
they might purchase onto those premises and process them." 
TR. 114. 
The Court replied: "Well, there is the requirement 
that they maintain the business on the premises: 'It is 
further stipulated and agreed between the parties hereto 
that the lessee shall conduct the business in such a manner 
as to adequately and timely fill ail orders and supply all 
requests of customers.' " TR. 114. 
The Court further said: "I think so far now there 
has been no sufficient evidence to justify a forfeiture on 
the ground of failure to take care of the business. But 
there, as I mentioned yesterday, the removal of the busi-
ness from the premises makes an entirely situation." TR. 
181. 
· The contract specifically provided the reason why a 
forfeiture could be declared by the Thorvaldsons, and the 
Thorvaldsons, after calling one witness in an attempt to 
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show that the Jones had failed to conduct the business 
in such a manner as to adequately and timely fill all or-
ders and supply all requests of customers, abandoned that 
theory and the Court made no finding with respect thereto. 
In reaching its conclusion, the Court declared a for-
ftitw'e for something which the contract did not require 
the Jones to do, to-wit: maintain a mix batch plant on the 
ThorvaJdson property. 
The evidence shows that from the early part of Janu-
ary, 1958, until they were evicted from the premises by 
the Court in 1962, the Jon~ were mining and selling sand 
from the Thorvaldson property and selling it to customers. 
TR. 115. 
Just how the maintenance of the mix batch plant on 
the Thorvaldson property would promote the sale of sand 
and gravel to a greater extent than the place where it was 
maintained was not e~lained by the evidence. The main-
tenance of the batch plant on the Thorvaldson property 
woo.ld not promote the sale of sand or gravel in their ·raw 
state to customers who came to the premises for either of 
these products. The maintenance of 1he batch plant could 
not possibly affect the removal of the overburden or work 
of the auditor in auditing the Jones books or to change their 
method of k-eeping hooks. It would not deter or aid an 
engineer in making a topographical survey to see how much 
sand and gravel had boon removed. 
As a general rule, the Courts hold that tenancies can-
not be terminated unless there is a forfeiture clause con-
tained in the contract. See 51 CJS, 683, "Landlord and 
Tenant", Section 104. We quote: 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
14 
"Necessity for Foreclosure Clause. In general a 
tenancy oannot be terminated for breach of covenant 
by the lessee unless there is an express provision in 
the lease for forfeiture or right of re-entry in such 
case. 
"In the absence of a statute to the contrary, ten-
ancy Ca.P...'Ilot be terminated for a breach of ~covenant 
by the lessee unless there is an express and distinct 
provision in the lease for forfeiture or right of re-entry 
on the occurrence of the breach or unless the breach 
disaffirms or impugns the title of the lessor and tends 
to defeat the reversion." 
We quote from 32 Am. Juris., Sec. 848, page 721: 
"A stipulation giving the lessor the right to re-enter 
and declare a forfe~iture for the breach of specified cov-
enants of the lease impliedly excludes the right to re-
enter for the breach orf other covenants." Citing 
Burnes v. McCubbin, 3 Kan. 221, 87 Am. Dec. 468. 
From 51 CJS, Sec. 102, p. 677, we quote: 
"Forfeitures by acts of the parties to a lease, be-
cause of a breach of a covenant or condition or wrong-
ful act of the tenant, are not favored by the courts." 
See 12 Am. Juris., page 1016, Sec. 436, under "Con-
tracts'.' We quote: 
"Forfeitures are not favored by the law; indeed, 
they are regarded with disfavor. It is well settled that 
forfeituTes by implication or by construction, not com-
pelled by express requirements, are regarded with dis-
favor. Contracts involving a forfeiture ,cannot be ex-
tended beyond the literal meaning of the words used. 
Since forfeitures are not favored either in equity or 
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in law. provisions for forfeitures are to receive, where 
the intent is doubtful, a strict construction against 
those for whose benefi,t they are introduced. Courts 
a r·e reluctant to declare and enforce a forfeiture if by 
reasonable interpretation it can be avoided. Forfeit-
ures are enforced only where there is clearest evidence 
that that was what was meant by the stipulation of the 
parties." 
Quoting from 51 CJS, Sec. 104, p. 684: 
"\Vhere grounds of forfeiture are expressly desig-
nated in the lease, a forfeiture will not be permitted 
on other grotmds." Citing 112 SE, 512, Easley Coal 
Co. v. Brush Creek Coal Co. 
See 32 Am. Juris, Sec. 848, p. 721, under "Landlord and 
tenant". We quote: 
''Forfeiture Clauses ... Moreover, the settled prin-
ciple of both law and equity that contractual provisions 
for forfeitures are looked upon with disfavor applies 
with full force to stipulations for forfeitures found in 
leases; such stipulations are not looked upon with 
favor by the court, but on the contrary axe strictly 
construed against the party seeking to invoke them. 
As has been said, the right to declare a forfeiture of 
a lease must be distinctly reserved; the proof of the 
happening of the event on which the right is to be exer-
cised must be clear; the party entitled to do so must 
exercise his right promptly; and the result of enforcing 
the forfeiture must not be unconscionable." 
We quote from 14 Am. Juris., 481, under title, "Cov-
enants, Conditions and RestriCtions": 
"It is the general rule that in every case the deter-
mination of the question whether a particular clause 
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or provision creates a covenant or condition subse-
quent depends primarily upon the intention of the par-
ties. If the language is clear and plain, the intention 
of the parties is presumed to be what the language 
clearly purports and the court decides the question 
from that language. In those cases, however, where 
the language is ambiguous and may create either a 
covenant or a condition, the court, in determining 
whether a covenant or conditioo was created, ac-
tively seeks to ascertain the intention orf the parties. 
One important factor in the consideration of this ques-
tion which is often conrtrolling, is that if there is any 
doubt, the Court will favor the construction of a cov-
enant rather than a condition, because conditions are 
looked upon with disfavor by the cou.rts and all doubt-
ful cases are decided in favor of a covenant construc-
tion." 
See the case of Joyce v. ~rupp, 257 Pac, 124. We 
quote from that case: 
''The distinction between conditions and covenants 
is a decided one and the principles applica~ble quite dif-
ferent. A condition is a qualification annexed to an 
estate, upon the happening of wlhich the estate is en-
larged or defeated, and it differs from a covenant, in 
that it is created by ·mutual agreement of the parties, 
and is binding upon both, whereas a covenant is an 
agreement of the covenantor only. A breach of a con-
dition on which an estate is granted works a for-
feiture of the esrtrute, while 1Jhe breach of a sole agree-
ment of the covenantor is merely ground for the re-
covery of damages.'' 
See Conolley v. Power, 232 Pac, 744, (Cal.) In this 
case the contract ibetween the parties contained this lang-
uage: 
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"It is expressly understood, stipulated, and agreed 
that all of the terms, promises, agreements, and pro-
visions of this lease are express conditions, and not 
mere covenants, and upon the breach or failure of the 
lessees to carry out any of the same this lease shall 
terminate and expire at the option of the lessor, and 
all rights hereunder shall be forfeited, and the said les-
sees are to immediately deliver up peaceful possession 
to the lessor. 
"Time and punctuality are material to, and are of 
the very essence of this agreement, and of every part 
or portion thereof, to which the element of time and 
punctuality are applicable.'' 
In interpreting this language, the Court stated that a 
forfeiture can never take place by an implication, but must 
be affected by express unambiguous language. As pointed 
out before, the language in the present lease was certain 
and unambiguous as to the reason why a forfeiture could 
be declared and the Court made no finding with respect to 
that issue, but declared a forfeiture for what the Court said 
was an implied agreement. 
See Easely Coal Co. v. Brush Creek Coal Co., 112 SE, 
512. The facts are as follows: The Coal River Mining 
Company leased certain coal land to Dalton and Bucks. 
Lessees assigned their interest in the property to the Brush 
Creek Coal Company. The assignment was made with the 
consent of the lessor. Later the Brush Creek Coal Com-
pany attempted to assign its interest in the property to Eas-
ely Coal Company, the plaintiff in tllis case. The lease con-
tained the clause which reads: "ThiS lease shall not be as-
signed or mortgaged by the lessees, or any part :thereof 
sublet, except by consent of the lessor in writing." 
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Plaintiff claimed that the original lessor, by reason of 
his assent to the assignment to the lessee may now assign 
his rights as freely a:s if no restriction upon assignments 
had been inserted in it. 
The Court said: 
"\Vhefuer the Coal River :Mining Company has the 
right of re--entry it claims depends upon the interpre-
tation of the lease as to the status of the covenant or 
condition in question with reference to the re-entry or 
forfeiture clause" 
We quote further from the Court's opinion : 
"Forfeitures of estates are not favored in law. The 
right to forfeit must be clearly stipulated for in terms, 
else it does not exist. Every breach of a covenant or 
condition does not confer tt upon the injured party. 
It never does., unless it is so provided in the instrument 
Such breaches are usually compensable in damages, 
and if the forfeiture has not been stipulated for, it is 
presumed that the injured party inrtended to be con-
tent with such right as is conferred by the ordinary 
remedies. The broken covenant or condition relied 
upon fo~ forfeiture must be foond not only in the in-
strument by dear and definite expression, but also 
within th€1 forfeiture clause by such e,xpression. A 
, covenant o~ condition merely implied, or an express one 
nort dearly within the forfeiture clause, will not sustain 
a claim of forfeiture by reason of its breach. Citing 
cases." 
We now addTess our rema,rks to the question of con-
sideration. Albout the time the lease was made and en-
tered into, Jones paid Thorvaldson $21,400.00 for equip-
ment to operate the business of mining and extracting sand 
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and .~ravt:'l from the leased premises. TR. 237. Thorvald-
son testified that he would not have leased the premises 
unless Jones had purchased the equipment. TR. 243. Jones 
testified that he would not have purchased the equipment 
if he had not obtained a lease for the premises from Thor-
valdson. because sand and gravel was necessary for the 
business. TR. 262. 
The lease recited that the Jones should pay 25c per 
cubic yard for all sand, gravel and top soil mined and sold 
by the Jones from the leased property and lc per yard for 
all fill dirt sold from the leased property. The lease also 
contains a proviso that Jones must supply all orders and 
requests of customers and upon failure to do so, the same 
will constitute grounds for forfeiture. 
Thorvaldson had operated the sand and gravel business 
at this same place for many years prior to the making of 
the lease (TR. 241) and must have known something about 
the volume of business the Jones might expect. This pro-
vision with respect to filling customers' needs was for his 
protection and to insure him an income from the property. 
This is not a contract where it was wholly optional 
with the Jones whether they should perform or not. The 
contract provides that if they should not perform and meet 
the requirements of customers, then Jones' rights in the 
property could be terminated. This contract is very anal-
ogous to what are termed "requirement contracts". See 
cases dealing with this question in Williston on Sales, Vol. 
2, Sec. 464 a, p. 739-742. We quote from that work: 
"It is true, as a general rule, that if it is wholly 
optional with one party to a bilateral agreement 
whether he shall perform or not, there is no legal con-
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tract. The promise of that party in such a bargain is 
illusory; that is, though in form a promise, it is so qua-
lified that the promisor really engages himself for 
nothing and his illusory promise is insufficient eonsid-
eration to suppoct: a counterpromise. A promise to 
buy such a quantity of goods as the buyer may there-
after order, or to take goods in such quantities 'as may 
be desired', or as the buyer 'may want', is not suffi-
cient -consideration since the buyer may refrain from 
buying at his option and without incurring legal detri-
ment himself or benefiting the other party. 
"It was held in an early Minnesota case that an 
agreement to sell all that the buyer might require or 
want in his business was open to the same objection, 
though the buyer promised to buy all he should 
require; but the weight of authority is dearly and 
rightly otherwise, whether the mutual promises are to 
buy and sell all that the buyer requires or all that the 
seUer pToduces. Though it may be true that a seller 
by ceasing to manufacture may relieve himself from 
any performance and srt:ill keep a promise to sell all 
the goods that he manufactures, and similarly a buyer 
by gomg out of business may avoid performance while 
still observing the terms of an agreement to buy all 
that he requires, these results can be obtained only 
by conduct of the promisor which is in itself a legal 
dertriment, namely, the cessation of business. Even a 
promise to buy or sell only as much as the promisor 
chooses is a sufficient consideration for a counter-
promise when coupled with the agreement that what-
ever the buyer or seller chooses to buy or sell he will 
buy from or sell to the promisee. To put the matter 
in another way-the promise of a seller not to manu-
facture except for the, buyer, or the promise of a buyer 
nort to buy except from a particular seller, is clearly a 
promise to do something detrimental." 
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See Graudis, et al. v. Helfrich, (Mo.) 265 SW 2d, 371. 
That was an aetion for breach of contract. Plaintiff pro-
mised to disclose the source of a large quantity of coal and 
in rr-turn the defendants promised plaintiffs 50c per ton 
for ~ach ton of coal dclendant purchased or severed from 
such source. Plaintiff showed that defendant had severed 
20,000 tons and the verdict was for plaintiff in the amount 
of $10,000.00. We quote from a part of the Coullt's opin-
ion: 
~~Defendant initially contends that the purported 
·(wal contract was void for want of mutuality; that 
both parties were not bound by the alleged contract; 
that defendant did not agree to buy any coal; that 
there was no consideration for the alleged oral con-
tract .... the alleged contract .... was unilateral 
and unenforceable.' 
"The agreement entered into between Braudis and 
defendant constituted a bilateral contract, supported 
by the respective considerations of mutual promises. 
Braudis agreed to furnish information which appar-
ently might be beneficial to defendant. Defendant 
promised (an apparently possible benefit to Bra.udis) 
to pay for such information on the condition that he 
remove coal from the stated source otf sUJpply. These 
mutual promises constituted sufficient consideration 
for the bilateral contract." 
To that effect see Williston on Contracts, Vol. 1, Sec. 
104, p. 396. 
See Stern v. Premier Shirt Corporation, 103 NE 363. 
The <hn1: said: 
"Agreements to buy or sell what will be needed or 
required have been enforced by the Courts with uni-
fonnity." 
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In .A.llen v. Rose Park Pharmacy, 120 Utah, 608; 237 
Pac. 2d, 823, the Court said: 
"Mutual promises in each of which the promisor un-
dertakes some act or fore!bearance that will be, or ap-
parently may be, detrimental to the promisor or bene .. 
ficial tn the promisee, and neither orf which is void, are 
'sufficient consideration' for one another." 
To the same effect see G2nola Town v. Santaquin City, 
96 Utah, 88; 80 Pac 2d, 930. We quorte from the Court's 
decision: 
"It is said the contract lacks murtuality of obliga-
tion which prevents a court of equity from decreeing 
specific performance. The argument is that such lack 
of mutuality arises from the sixth paragraph of the 
agreement which reads as follows: 'It is undeT'stood 
and agreed between said parties that the Town of Ge-
no!a is attempting to get a government project to es-
tablish its pipe Hne system and in the event said town 
does not secure said project and obtain money there-
for, then it shall not be liable under this contract.' 
"The contention is that mutuality must be deter-
mined as of the date of making the contract which 
was August 18, 1936; that on said date it was impos-
sible to say whether Genola would be bound; that it 
lay within the control of Genola to determine whether 
it would be bound or whether it would bind Santa-
quin. Such is the case with many contracts whose 
binding effect depends upon a condition precedent, the 
carrying out o[ which condition precedent lies within 
the power of only ooe of the parties to the contract. 
The rule regarding mutuality of obligations as making 
the eontract amenable to specific perfonnance is more 
honored by exceptions than by obedience to the rule." 
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The Olurt held that the contract did not lack mutu-
ality. 
Holding to the same effect is a case from California, 
Lettuce Growers v. Union Sugar Company, 289 Pac 2d, 785. 
See Fayette Coal Company v. Lal{e and Explore Coal 
Cor-pm·ation, 23 ALR, 565. In this case there was a con-
tract in which the defendant agreed to take the output of 
two smrJl mines. There is no definite number of tons 
specified, nor is there even an estimate as to the number 
of tons expected to be shipped under the COilltract. The 
defendants contend that by the contract, it did not impose 
upon the plaintiff any duty to operate the mine; that the 
only obligation imposed upon it was to sell such coal as it 
produced at the mines to the defendant, and any time the 
contract became burdensome to it, it coold escape the obli-
gation of the same by simply closing down its mine and not 
producing any coal. The Court says: 
"It must be borne in mind that, when the parties 
entered into this contract, they intended to accom-
plish some purpose by it, and this court will not give 
to it a construction which will render it void, if it can 
reasonably be interpreted so as to give it effect. There 
is no uncertainty in the contract, except as to the sub-
ject matter thereof, nor does it appear to us that there 
is very great uncertamty in this regard. The plain-
tiff had two small ·mines from which it was producing 
coal, and the subject-matter of the contract was the 
wtput of these mines. The reasonable capacity of the 
mines at the time the contra.ot was entered into was 
apparent to anyone reasonably familiar with the coal 
business, and the defendant, when it purchased the 
wtput of these mines, could, and no doubt did, inform 
itself as to the amount of coal it could reasonably ex-
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pect to receive therefrom. .A.Jbsolute certainty is rarely 
attainable. All that is required is reasonable certainty. 
But the defendant insists that there is no obligation 
upon the plaintiff, under the contract, to operate the 
mines; that, even though it may be considered that 
it would have to deliver to the defendant all of the 
coal that it mined, still it could easily avoid its obli-
gation by simply closing down its plant. But is this 
true? The plaintiff sold and undertook to deliver to 
the defendant at a certain price the output of its mines. 
The parties contracted in relation to the conditions 
that existed at that time. Could the plaintiff as a mat-
ter of law, at ·any time, cease operations and avoid lia-
bility? We do not think so. We think the plaintiff 
was under rthe same obligation to operate these mines 
in the ord:ina.cy way, in good faJth, that the defendant 
was to take the coal produced under those circum-
stances.'' 
On the question of mutuality and consideration, see 
McMichael v. Price, 58 Pac 2d, 549 (Okla.) The action was 
instituted by Price doing business as Sooner Sand Company 
to recover damages for breach of contract. Plaintiff re-
covered. The action was upon a contract which provides 
that Price was seUing and shipping sand from Tulsa, Ok-
lahoma to various points in the United States and that the 
second party was the owner of a tract Olf land described 
in the lease. The plaintiff, Price, agreed to buy from the 
second party all rtJhe sand df various grades which he could 
sell. Following the execUJtion of the contract, the defend-
ant was alleged to have failed, neglected and refused to 
furnish all of the sand which Price sold and defendant ex-
pressly repudiated and renounced the contract. We quote: 
"Defendant contends that the contract between the 
parties was a mere revocable offer and is not a valid 
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and binding contract of purchase and sale for want 
of mutuality. The general rule is that in construing 
a contract where the consideration on the one side is 
<Ul offer or an agreement to sell, and an the other side 
an offer or agreement to buy, the obligation of the 
parties to sell and buy must be mutual, to render the 
contract binding on either party, or, as it is s01netimes 
stated, if one of the parties, not having suffered any 
previous detriment, can escape future liability under 
the contract, that party may be said to have a "free 
way out" and the contract lacks mutuality. (Citing 
cases) Attention is directed to the specific language 
used in the contract binding the defendant to 'furnish 
cll of the sand of various grades and qualities which 
ttle first party can sell' and whereby plaintiff is bound 
•to purchase and accept from second party all of the 
sand of various grades and qualities whiJCh the said 
first pary (plaintiff) can sell.' lt is urged that plain-
tiff had no established business and was not bound rto 
sell any sand whatever and might escape all liability 
under the terms of the contract by a mere failure or 
refusal to sell sand. In this connection it is to be noted 
that the contract recites that plaintiff is 'engaged in 
the business of selling and shipping sand from Tulsa, 
Oklahoma, to various points.' The parties based their 
contract on this agreed predicate." 
The Court said: 
"By the terms of the contract 1Jh.e prire to be paid 
for sand was definitely fixed. Plaintiff was bound by 
a solemn covenant of the contract to purchase all the 
sand he was able to seU from defendant and for a 
breach of such covenant could have been made to re-
spond in damages. The argument of defendant that 
the plaintiff could escape liability under the conrtract 
by going out of the sand business is without force in 
view of our determination, in line with the authorities 
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hereinabove cited, that it was the intent of the parties 
to enter into a contract which would be mutually bind-
ing.'' 
POINT II 
THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE 
JONES' FAILURE TO REMOVE OVERBURDEN, FAIL-
URE TO MAKE SALES SLIPS AND JONES' REMOVAL 
OF SAND OFF THE PREMISES WITHOUT ACCOUNT-
ING FOR ANY OF IT, AND FAILURE TO ACCOUNT 
FOR ALL SALES OF SAND AND GRAVEL CONSTI-
TUTEID GROUNDS FOR FORFEITURE. 
We submit that there is no competent evidence in the 
record that the Jones failed to remove the overburden or 
failed to make sales slips in the mrumer and at the time 
as required by the contract, and that Jones failed to ac-
COIUilt for sand removed from the Thorvaldson property 
onto the Jones property for purpose of processing the same; 
but, if it be assumed that the Cow1:' s finding regarding 
these matters is correct, we assert that they afford no basis 
for declaring that the Jones have forfeited their rights in 
the property. If the Jones' failure to remove overburden 
had progressed to the point where they could not supply 
the needs of customers, then that might afford a basis of 
forfeiture, but such is not the case. All the other findings 
relate to mattevs that are compensable in damages and 
where such is the case, the Courts will not declare a for-
feiture. 
It is obvious, from the Court's remarks, that he did 
not feel the above finding constituted grounds for forfeit-
ure. We quote: 
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.. The ones that I am concerned with mostly would 
be rna terinls from other sources, the removal of over-
burden, and the removal of the business from the leased 
land." TR. 307. 
"The overburden, perhaps, could be rectified if 
there is any default with respect to that. The other 
matters probably cannot." TR. 307. 
As to the Jones' failure to account for income, we 
quote the Court's remarks after the evidence was all in: 
"Failure to account for income. I think there has 
been some failure, but probaibly an honest mistake has 
been made. I think that is insufficient to justify for-
feiture of the lease." TR. 306. 
We quote from 12 Am. Juris., Sec. 440, p. 1020, under 
title, .. Contracts": 
"It is not every breach of a contract or failure 
exactly to perform--certainly not every partial failure 
to pelform-that entitles the other party to rescind. 
A breach which goes to only a part of the consideration, 
is incidental and subordinate to the main purpose of 
the contract, and may be compensated in damages 
does not warrant a recision of the contract; the in-
jured party is still bound to perform his part of the 
agreement, and his only remedy for the breach consists 
of the damages he has suffered therefrom. (Citing 
cases) Generally the failure of performance in order 
to constitute a ground for recision must be total, such 
as to defeat the object of the contract, or render irt 
unattainable. The right to recision does not exist 
where there has been a substantial, though not liter-
ally a complete, performance. (Citing J. W. Ellison 
Son & Co. v. Flat Top Grocery Co., 71 S. E. 391) 
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On the question of recision or forfeiture of a contract, 
see Canepa v. Durham, 153 Pac 2d, 899. We quote: 
''A partial failure olf performance is no ground for 
recision or£ contract unless it defeats the very oibject 
of the contract, renders that object impossible of wt-
tainment, or concerns matters of such prime impor-
tance that contract would not have been made if de-
fault in that particular had been e~pected." 
On the questio.n of forfeiture, see Sonken-Galambra 
Corp. v. Abels, 95 Pac 2d, 601. We quote from the syllabus:, 
"Generally the failure of performance in order to 
constitute a groun.d for recision must be total, such as 
to defeat the object of the contract or rendering it 
unattainable. 
"Generally, forfeitures are regarded with disfavor 
and an interpretation which does involve a forfeiture 
is not favored." 
Again quoting from 12 Am. Juris., page 1018: 
"Resdsion is sometimes warranted by a breach of 
contract. Whe,re covenants are mutual and dependent, 
the failure of one party to perform authorizes the 
other party to rescind the contract. The failure to 
perform a promise, the performance of which is a con-
dition, entitles the other party to the contract to a res-
cision thereof. But where the contract has been largely 
carried into execution, and the engagements of the 
parties were to be performed in the future, and their 
performance was not made a condition, but rested 
merely in covernanrt, a breaoh of them lays the foun-
dation of an action, but no1Jhing more." 
See Farnsworth v. Minnesot:Ja and P.R. Company, 92 
U.S., 49. We quote from that case: 
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"Where the penalty or forfeiture is inserted in a 
contract merely to secure the performance or enjoy-
ment of a collateral object, the latter is considered 
as the principal intent of the instrument and the pen-
alty i~ deemed as an accessory; but in every such case 
the test to ascertain whether relief can or cannot be 
had in equity is to consider whether compensation can 
or cannot be made." (Citing 104 U. S. 88). 
See the case of Priddy v. School District No. 78, 39 
.AILR, 133·1. We quote from that case: 
"The law is opposed to torfeiture of estates and 
will not imply a forfeiture where none is expressed by 
the terms of conveyance. (Citing a number of cases). 
"If the forfeitw-e is not expressed by the terms of 
the conveyance, an additional use of the property, if 
it should constitute a wrong, cannot be made the basis 
for an implied forfeiture , because the deed may happen 
to provide for a forfeiture for some other act." (Cit-
ing cases) 
See State, ex rel. City of Tacoma v. Sunset Telephone 
and Telegraph Company, 150 Pac, 427. We quote from 
page 432 of the opinion: 
"It is a principal of universal application that for-
feitures are abhorred in the law and will not be de-
clared, except in the clearest and most positive cases, 
or where the contract broken so provides in express 
terms. A forfeiture will be avoided, if possible. The 
franchise ordinance was not plain and positive that 
one of the conditions upon which it was granted was 
that the holders of the franchise should establish, main-
tain, and operate an automatic system only, during 
the tenn of the franchise, for it was authorized also 
to conduct a general telephone business, and 'therefore 
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dedicated its property to public use with all the duties 
liabilities and requirements as well as privileges und~ 
our co!11Stitution and laws, such dedication implied." 
See the case orf McNeese v. Wood reported in 267 Pac, · 
g-;7. In this case the lease contained two provisions for 
forfeiture. One, that if the premises were used for any 
improper, unlawful purpose that this shall work a forfeit-
ure of the lease. There was another clause whioh said if 
the lessess failed to pay rent for a period of 30 days, then 
the lessee at his option might declare the lease forfeited. 
The question was whether the 30 days period prevailed or 
whetheT under the unlawful purpose use, they could im-
mediately declare the lease forfeited. Utpon the first hear-
ing before the Supreme Court, the Court held that the 
lease could be declared forfeited, but upon rehearing this 
was reversed and the Court said this: 
"A condition involving a forfeiture must be strictly 
interpreted against the party for whose benefit it is 
created. 
"'Forfeitures, as such, are not favored by the courts, 
and are never enforced if they are couched in ambig-
uous terms. 
"A forleiture can be enforeed only when there is 
such a breach shown as it was the clear and manifest 
intention of the parties to provide for. 
''The burden is upon the party claiming the for-
feiture to show that such was the unmistakable in-
tention orf the instrument. If the agreement can be 
reasonably interpreted so as to avoid the forfeiture, it is 
our duty to do so. (Quoting cases from California) 
"References to cases orf like import might be mul-
tiplied." (Citing a number of cases) 
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POINT ill 
THERE WAS NO COMPEfENT EVIDENCE THAT 
THE JONES EVER OBTAINED SAND OR GRAVEL 
ffiOM OTHER THAN THE LEASED PREMISES UN-
LESS IT WAS NECESSARY TO DO SO TO FILL CUS-
TOMERS' REQUIREMENTS. 
The Court made no finding that the Jones' acquisition 
of sand or gravel from a source other than from the leased 
premises violated the terms of the lease; but did remark 
on this question while outlining his concern about the is-
sues in the case. We, therefore, direct a few remarks to 
that issue. 
Jones testified that as long as he could get gravel from 
the Oldroyd pit, originally subleased from ':Dhorvaldsons to 
Jones, he did not go anywhere else for it unless it was a 
certain specified material that somebody wanted. TR. 
267. He also testified that he got very little sand from any 
other source and that it was specified by the customers 
as to the other source. TR. 267-268. 
We submit that under the evidence, Thorvaldsons' pri-
mary purpose in making the lease was for the purpose of 
selling their sand and that if Jones had failed to supply a 
customer's needs merely because they could not get the 
specified gravel from the leased property and thus not make 
the sale, such action would have been in violation of the 
terms of the lease. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court erred in finding that the Jones' operation 
of the mix batch plant off the leased premises constituted 
grounds for declaring that the Jones had forfeited their 
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rights in the leased premises. The Court also erred in 
finding that the Jones' alleged failure to remove the over-
burden and failure to make sales slips and removal of sand 
off the premises without accounting for any of it and fail-
ure to accom1t for aJl sales of sand and gravel constitute 
grounds for forfeiture. If there was a breach of these cov-
enants then the remedy is compe!Ilsable in damages. The 
Court erred in not finding that the only grounds for de-
claring a forfeiture was that which was plainly set forth 
in the lease, to ... wit, failure to operate the business so as to 
adequately and timely fill all orders and supply all requests 
of customers and that there was no evidence of the Jones' 
failw-e in this regard. 
Respectfully submitted, 
DAVE McMULLIN 
20 East Utah Avenue 
Payson, Utah 
DALLAS H. YOUNG for 
YOUNG, YOUNG & SORENSEN 
227 North University Avenue 
Provo, Utah 
Attorneys for Appellants 
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